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Research  Council  of Canada,  the Rockefeller  Foundation  Study and Conference  Center,  and the Bard 
Center  at Bard College. Contemporary  sociological  theory,  like  contemporary  politics,  is  marked  by  the 
somewhat  paradoxical  conviction  that  progressivism  is  out  of  date.  Social  change  cannot  be 
denied  as  a reality,  but  its  coherent,  cumulative,  developmental  character  is  frequently  called 
into  doubt.  No  cause,  moreover,  can  plausibly  justify  itself  today  simply  by  claiming  to  be  “in 
the  line  of  social  development.”  The  paradox  involved  in  social  or  political  analyses  which 
conclude,  in  effect,  that  it  is no  longer  progressive  to  be  progressive  points  to  a needless 
confusion.  First,  then,  it  is  perfectly  possible  and  often  valuable  to  retain  an  analytical  concept 
of  social  proqress  in order  to  maintain  critical  contact  with  the  sophisticated  tradition  of  social 
theory  that  emphasizes  the  importance  of  irreversible  experiential  learning  in  the  development 
of  vital  congeries  of  social  relations  over  time  (Luhmann  198  1,  1984).  This  conception  need  not 
assume  that  all  social  phenomena  can  be  referred  to  social  progress  or  that  disruptions  and 
radical  discontinuities  cannot  occur,  because  it  need  not  imply  that  social  progress  is  the  only 
subject  matter  for  social  theory.  And  it  certainiy  does  not  commit  the  anaiyst  to  a normative 
prooressivism,  the  second  context  in  which  progress  is  a key  term.  The  abandonment  of 
progress  as  a criterion  for  evaluating  social  achievements  and  projects  does  not,  however, 
imply  the  rejection  of  everything  earlier  done  and  justified  in the  name  of  progress,  but  only 
their  reanalysis  and  reassessment.  Because  political  life  does  not  necessarily  benefit  from 
nominalist  clean  sweeps,  it  may  even  be  justifiable  to  continue  referring  to  such  achievements 
and  projects  as  “progressive”,  so  long  as  it  is  made  unmistakably  clear  that  the  progress  here 
intended  is  a project,  political  in the  broad  sense,  and  not  a process  in the  sense  of  the 
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This  essay  is  about  trade  unions,  an  institution  that  arose  to  play  an  important  part  in 
relation  to  the  social  progress  characterizing  much  of  the  present  century  and  that  served  as  an 
important  reference  point  for  several  varieties  of  normative  progressivism.  The  past  two 
decades  of  social  progress  in  the  most  prosperous  established  nations  appear  to  be  rendering 
the  institution  obsolete.  The  objective  of  the  paper  is  to  reject  all  progressivist  interpretations 
of  this  trend  --  neither  condemning  the  development  as  a regressive  obstacle  to  progress  nor 
welcoming  it  as  a normal  part  of  the  developmental  process.  The  aim  is  to  inquire  anew  into  the 
historical  project  of  trade  unions  and  the  interplay  between  this  project  and  the  processes  of 
social  progress,  past  and  prospective.  The  analytical  thesis  is  that  the  institution  has  been 
multi-dimensional,  serving  in one  of  its  dimensions  as  an  important  political  response  to  social progress.  The  normative  problem  is  whether  the  unions’  political  contribution  to  a  socially 
conscious  political  democratization  can  be  revived  or  transferred,  when  the  unions’  constitutive 
adaptations  to  past  stages  of  social  progress  appear  to  be  failing  so  badly  in the  present. 
After  a brief  overview  designed  to  show  that  analytical  awareness  of  social  progress 
has  historically  been  linked  to  critical  politically-minded  theoretical  currents  as  well  as  to 
progressivist  theories  and  that  it  has  been  the  ideology-process  that  has  tended  to  smudge  this 
distinction,  we  briefiy  outiine  three  aiternative  progressivist  approaches  to  unionism.  Next 
comes  a review  of  the  contemporary  state  of  the  problem  and  a proposal  for  an  analytical 
approach  that  avoids  the  holistic  errors  of  progressivist  analyses  and  lets  the  political  issues  be 
properly  posed.  In  this  approach,  unions  are  situated  in the  context  of  labor  regimes,  an 
historical  concept  that  highlights  the  dual  character  of  unions,  between  social  progress  snd 
political  constitution.  The  contemporary  decline  of  unions  is  then  analyzed  in  relation  to  both 
levels  of  analysis.  The  political  dimension  poses  questions  of  strategy  for  unions,  and  the  study 
closes  with  a critical  assessment  of  strategic  alternatives  generated  by  the  progresslvist 
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illustrates  the  social-theoretical  point  of  the  exercise.  The  demise  of  progressivism  does  not 
automatically  condemn  either  its  contributions  to  social  theoretical  analyses  of  social  progress 
or  its  political  projects. 
I.  Progress  and  Politics 
The  perception  of  social  progress  enters  into  Enlightenment  thought  in  the  context  of 
political  theory,  before  the  emergence  of  social  theory  as  such,  and  the  phenomena  intended  by 
the  concept  are  by  no  means  universally  or  uniformly  accepted  as  unconditional  benefits.  At  this 
point,  social  progress  is  often  acknowledged  as  a reality  that  challenges  the  continued 
timeliness  of  established  political  doctrines  but  that  does  not  necessarily  show  the  way  ?o a 
satisfactory  new  alternative.  Although  Rousseau’s  paradoxically  artful  challenge  to  the  progress 
of  the  “arts  and  sciences”  in his  First  Discourse  was  doubtless  an  idiosyncratic  provocation,  his 
Second  Discourse  claim  that  a scientifically-grounded  conjectural  reconstruction  of  social 
development  .would  explain  why  modern  humanity  must  formulate  its  political  designs  without 
hopes  of  achieving  classical  excellence  touches  a  far  more  common  chord  (Rousseau  1973). In  his  pioneering  venture  in  social  theory,  Adam  Ferguson  identifies  “progress”  as  a 
central  feature  of  the  main  processes  that  constitute  the  history  of  civil  society,  but  he  insists 
that  each  stage  in  this  composite  progress  poses  a characteristic  complex  of  difficulties  for 
political  action  and  that  these  difficulties  are  more  vexing  and  dangerous  at  higher  stages  than  at 
lower.  There  are  doubtless  steady  improvements  in  the  arts  and  sciences  that  put  external 
nature  increasingly  in the  service  of  humankind,  on  this  view,  and  there  are  stadial  advances  in 
the  civil  pacification  of  human  relations,  but  there  are  also  debilitating  distortions  in  human 
rr--r;+;er  nhmCem*  I-e+  -W-.  +Clsrs  mk*WWWar  I)+ trrsll  nc  men~ntinn  thrndc  +m  ,-ellnr+irrcl  ranghilitirrc  Laj&%lLl=~  b”I  13VL+WzIII  “I,  LI1U3G  U,cWlyczJ. a3  ““=,I  -3  III”“II.II  ‘y  .I II TO,*  L” b#“1IFItiL(“T  tiap=YIIILIWJ 
for  self-mobilization  and  action  (Ferguson  1966,  1975,  Kettler  1965,  1977,  1978). 
Condorcet’s  rhapsodic  invocation  of  linear  progress  as  the  guarantee  of  secular  salvation  is 
perhaps  the  more  eccentric  conception  until  late  in the  nineteenth  century,  not  least  because  of 
the  events  that  brought  his  speculations  to  a violent  halt  (Condorcet,  1955).  Fifty  years  later,  de 
Tocqueville  (118351  1987)  never  doubts  the  social  reality  of  the  progressive  movement  towards 
equality,  but  his  analysis  is  dedicated  to  the  search  for  political  strategies  to  tame  and  manage 
this  development.  As  John  Stuart  Mill’s  generous  borrowings  from  Tocqueville  (Mill  [ 18351 
1977,  [ 18401  1977)  show,  this  complex  attitude  to  social  progress  cannot  simply  be  equated 
with  conservatism.  For  an  important  current  in  social  thought,  characterized  above  all  by  a 
thematization  of  problematic  relationships  between  social  and  political  theory,  progress  has 
been  as  much  part  of  the  problem  as  it has  been  the  precondition  for  any  possible  solutions. 
The  claim  that  processes  of  inevitable  social  progress  have  only  to  be  unchained  in  order 
to  bring  rationai  soiutions  to  aii  difficuities  has  figured  more  Ci&3riy  iii  ihe  Sii-iipiiii-&  hi~~&fXi 
constructs  of  political  ideology  than  in self-reflective  theoretical  designs.  “Progressivism”  more 
properly  pertains  to  such  formations.  But  even  where  theories  can  be  said  to  be  premissed  on 
an  “idea  of  progress”  that  is  thought  to  legitimate  the  direction  as  well  as  to  uncover  the 
tendencies  of  social  change  (Bury  1920,  Nisbet  1969,  Hayek  19521,  in the  progressivist 
manner,  they  share  at  least  one  common  preoccupation  with  the  more  critical,  political  current. 
The  perception  of  social  progress  poses  fundamental  questions  about  organization.  Social 
change  brings  with  it  a critical  disorganization  of  established  institutions  for  collective  purposive 
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new  organization.  Progressivist  thinkers  like  Saint-Simon  and  Comte  stress  the  organizational 
resources  engendered  by  progress;  critical  thinkers  like  Durkheim  and  Weber  equally  stress  the sometimes  contradictory  needs.  For  the  one  group,  progressive  increments  of  social 
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organizational  engineering  technologies  to  obviate  political  operations  of  choice,  power, 
conflict-management,  and  coercive  coordination.  For  the  others,  the  new  developments  bring 
new  powers  and  disabilities  requiring  uncertain  reconstitutive  organization  and  political 
management,  in the  face  of  forceful  oppositions  and  difficulties.  During  the  early  decades  of 
the  twentieth  century,  the  ideologized  expressions  of  the  two  currents  were  often  allied  against 
hostile  and  defensive  old  power  structures,  but  even  then  the  internal  tensions  within  the 
resulting  progressive  political  movements  were  often  manifest. 
Urban  progressivism  arises  as  a political  tendency  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century 
above  all  in conjunction  with  a perception  of  “the  social  question”.  This  referred  to  challenging, 
Irresistibly  emerging  phenomena  of  both  social  disorganization  and  social  organization.  The  new 
disorganization  was  epitomized  by  threats  from  dangerous  slums  and  abusive  workplaces;  the 
new  organization,  in  turn,  by  state  formation,  legal  differentiation,  reform  organization,  capitalist 
concentration,  and  collective  action  by  workers.  Progressives  agreed  in understanding  both 
complexes  as  aspects  of  progressive  transition,  mandating  responses  that  went  beyond  the 
political  alternatives  thought  possible  by  liberals  and  conservatives.  The  social  question  called 
for  a  sociai  answer  --  from  sociai  responsibiiity,  sociai  work  and  sociai  iegisiation  to  sociai 
democracy.  And  conflictual,  interest-generated  politics  had  to  be  replaced  by  social  science, 
yielding  social  technologies,  social  awareness,  and  problem-solving  social  action  (Dewey  1935). 
Those  were  the  general  terms  of  progressivist  discourse,  but  the  range  of  interpretative 
and  policy  responses  to  the  dis/  organizational  developments  hints  at  the  theoretical  fault-lines 
within  the  progressivist  consensus,  revealing  the  movement  as  being  in  effect  a coalition 
between  a tendency  to  presuppose  progress  as  wholistic  process  and  a tendency  to  treat  it  as 
project.  Numerous  issues  could  be  cited  to  illustrate  this  point,  but  none  is  more  central  or 
revealing  than  the  range  of  responses  to  the  conflicts  attending  worker’s  self-organization. 
Simply  stated,  the  division  appears  as  one  between  those  who  view  the  growth  of  a new 
power  center  as  a transitional  symptom  of  a problem  to  be  overcome  in  the  course  of  social 
progress  and  those  who  accept  it  as  the  beginnings  of  a new  departure  in  the  political 
constitution  of  social  life.  Since  coalition-forming  ideologies 
and  coalitional  politics  strive  to  blur  internally  divisive  issues, 
leave  a lot  of  room  for  ambiguities 
the  historical  evidence  of  inner tension  is  often  indirect,  articulated  in  terms  of  detail  questions  of  tactics  and  policies. 
But  a retrospective  view  undistracted  by  the  ideological  dynamics  of  self-confident 
progressivist  political  campaigning  will  see  the  patterned  differences  in  emphasis  and  will  thus 
be  able  to  weigh  the  elements  of  the  progressivist  project’without  being  deluded  by 
indefensible  assumptions  about  a progressivist  process.  The  contemporary  crisis  of 
progressivism  makes  it  easier  to  see  the  horizontal  division  between  the  two  analytical 
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can  be  especially  productively  studied  at  the  instance  of  the  debate  occasioned  by  the  many 
signs  of  decline  in trade  unionism  in the  West. 
2.  Unions  and  Progress 
Even  at  the  level  of  political  ideology,  it  is  of  course  oversimple  to  speak  of  only  one 
form  of  progressivism.  And  the  theoretically  reflected  thought  that  was  adapted  by 
broaressivist  ideology  must  certainly  be  analytically  subdivided.  We  propose  a three-fold  r.  -a‘  -------- 
vertical  division  to  complement  the  principal  horizontal  division  that  we  have  been  discussing, 
conventionally  accepting  Marx,  Weber,  and  Durkheim  as  emblems  for  the  three.  Each  category 
is  distinguished  by  a  characteristic  conception  of  the  central  dynamics  of  social  progress  --  (1) 
class  conflict  grounded  in a depth-structure  of  lawful  economic  development,  (2)  rationalization’ 
as  a  function  of  cumulative,  institutionaiized  individuai  acts  and  transactions,  and  i3i  coiiective 
integration  of  ever  greater  social  differentiation.  A  systematic  treatment  would  work  out  the 
importance  of  our  horizontal  divide  within  each  of  these  theoretical  approaches,  but  our 
present  special  interest  will  lead  us  to  concentrate  principally  on  the  progress-as-process  side, 
since  this  is  the  side  most  evident  in the  most  influential  subsequent  social-scientific  theories. 
The  progress  of  sociology  has  been  largely  a matter  of  disencumbering  these  theoretical 
models  from  their  seemingly  undertheorized  recognitions  of  discontinuities  not  readily 
subsumed  under  laws  of  social  progress.  This  disciplinary  progress,  most  would  agree,  has 
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the  abrupt  decline  of  unions  open  us  to  a reappropriation  of  their  potentials  for  comprehending 
political  complexity.  We  shall  attempt  to  indicate  the  nature  of  those  difficulties  and  to  illustrate 
the  possibilities  for  such  reappropriation,  remaining  within  the  comparatively  manageable  limits of  the  theme  we  have  selected.  This  will  quickly  move  us  from  the  level  of  grand  theory, 
introduce  a measure  of  problem-specific  eclecticism,  and  consequently  leave  us  with  future 
tasks  for  theoretical  reflection  upon  our  evolving  intellectual  strategy.  Our  present  objectives 
do  not  require  us  to  pretend  to  more;  theoretical  reconstruction  is  a  long-term,  collective 
enterprise,  and  its  starting  point,  we  are  told,  is typically  a concern  with  concrete  anomalies. 
Marx  and  Engels  both  began  their  distinctive  theoretical  departures  with  attempts  to 
comprehend  collective  movements  among  the  working  class,  including  the  organization  of  such 
movements  in trade  unions  (Marx  [ I8441  1975:  189-206,  Engels  I1 8451  1975:  295-583).  But 
their  need  to  specify  the  place  of  trade  unions  within  the  broader  pattern  of  social  progress 
gained  new  urgency  with  the  formation  of  the  First  International.  In  his  1866  “Instructions  for 
the  Delegates  of  the  Provincial  General  Council”,  Marx  clearly  formulates  his  conception  of  the 
unions’  dual  role,  as  essential  function  of  the  present  state  of  the  social  process  and  as  integral 
to  the  inherent  dynamics  of  change: 
Trades’  Unions  originally  sprang  up  from  the  spontaneous  attempts  of  workmen  at 
removing  or  at  least  checking  that  competition  [i.e.  the  unavoidable  competition 
among  the  workmen],  in  order  to  conquer  such  terms  of  contract  as  might  raise 
them  at  least  above  the  condition  of  mere  slaves.  The  immediate  object  of  Trades’ 
Unions  was  therefore  confined  to  everyday  necessities,  to  expediencies  for  the 
obstruction  of  the  incessant  encroachments  of  capital,  in one  word,  to  questions  of 
wages  and  time  of  labour.  This  activity  of  the  Trades’  Unions  is  not  only  legitimate,  it 
is  necessary.  It  cannot  be  dispensed  with  so  long  as  the  present  system  of 
production  lasts.  On  the  contrary,  it  must  be  generalised  by  the  formation  and  the 
combination  of  Trades’  Unions  throughout  all  countries.  On  the  other  hand, 
unconsciously  to  themselves,  the  Trades’  Unions  were  forming  centres  of  --- 
organisation  of  the  working  class,  as  the  medieval  municipalities  and  communes  did 
for  the  middle  class.  If  the  Trades’  Unions  are  required  for  the  guerilla  fights 
between  capital  and  labour,  they  are  still  more  important  as  orqanised  agencies  for 
superseding  the  very  system  of  waqe  labour  and  capitalist  w  (quoted  in  Lapides  -- 
1987:  64). 
This  remains  Marx’s  theoretical  account  of  unions,  carried  forward  by  Engels  after  Marx’s  death 
and  by  orthodox  Marxism. At  a more  concrete,  practical  level,  however,  Marx  and  Marxists  are  plagued  by  the  all 
but  universal  tendency  of  unions  to  perform  the  first  function  at  the  cost  of  the  hypothesized 
second.  Most  Marxist  analyses  of  actual  unions,  accordingly,  follows  the  pattern  also  laid  down 
by  Marx  in  ‘(Wages,  Price  and  Profit”  in  1865  (quoted  in  Lapides  1987:  95): 
Trades  Unions  work  well  as  centres  of  resistance  against  the  encroachments  of 
capital.  They  fail  partially  from  an  injudicious  use  of  their  power.  They  fail  generally 
from  limiting  themselves  to  a guerilla  war  against  the  effects  of  the  existing  system, 
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as  a  lever  for  the  final  emancipation-of  the  working  class,  that  is  to  say,  the  ultimate 
abolition  of  the  wages  system. 
Marx’s  consequent  injunctions  to  unions  have  appeared  no  less  appropriate  to  Marxists  in  the 
present  century: 
Apart  from  their  original  purposes,  they  must  now  learn  to  act  deliberately  as 
organising  centres  of  the  working  class  in the  broadest  sense  of  its  complete 
emancipation.  They  must  aid  every  social  and  political  movement  tending  in that 
direction.  Considering  themselves  and  acting  as  the  champions  of  the  whole  working 
class,  they  cannot  fail  to  enlist  the  non-society  men  into  their  ranks.  They  must  look 
carefully  after  the  interests  of  the  worst  paid  trades,  such  as  the  agricultural 
labourers,  rendered  powerless  by  exceptional  circumstances.  They  must  convince 
the  world  at  large  that  their  efforts,  far  from  being  narrow  and  selfish,  aim  at  the 
emancipation  of  the  downtrodden  miiiions  (quoted  in iapides  i987:  651. 
Equally  common  in  the  subsequent  history  of  Marxism,  --  and  fatefully  so  --  are  the  following 
sentiments  in an  187  1  letter  by  Engels: 
The  trade-union  movement,  above  all the  big,  strong  and  rich  trade  unions,  has 
become  more  an  obstacle  to  the  general  movement  than  an  instrument  of  its 
progress;  and  outside  of  the  trade  unions  there  are  an  immense  mass  of  workers  in 
London  who  have  kept  quite  a distance  away  from  the  political  movement  for  several 
years,  and  as  a result  are  very  ignorant.  But  on  the  other  hand  they  are  also  free  of 
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therefore  form  excellent  material  with  which  one  can  work  (quoted  in  Lapides  1987: 
81). Marxist  progressivism,  in  short,  is  distinguished  by  clear  expectations  about  the  important  place 
of  unions,  as  well  as  by  a constant  need,  at  another  level,  to  deal  with  the  disappointment  of 
those  expectations.  The  result  has  been  a rich,  complex,  and  ingenious  literature,  setting  the 
agenda  for  most  interpretations  of  the  phenomenon.  The  present  question,  however,  is  whether 
the  progressivist  theoretical  underpinnings  must  not  simpiy  be  put  aside  as  mistaken. 
While  unions  do  not  figure  so  centrally  in  the  other  two  types  of  progressivist  thought, 
they  do  appear  historicaiiy  as  progressive  O~Cpiit~tiOiiS  Siraif3giCaii\i  iriiporiaiii  to  the  fonvai-d 
movement  implied  by  the  emergence  of  the  social  question.  Weber’s  German  editors  place 
Weber’s  reflections  on  the  rationalizing  contribution  of  trade  unions,  specifically  in  Germany,  in 
the  last  paragraphs  of  the  text  that  is  published  as  Wirtschaft  und  Gesellschaft  (Weber  [ 192  11 
1976:  868).  He  is  speaking  of  dangers  implicit  in  the  general  progressive  development  towards 
democracy,  especially  the  possibility  that  the  mass  might  be  driven  towards  an  emotionalist 
politics  of  the  streets.  He  sees  the  decisive  counter  to  this  in  rational  organizations  within 
democracy.  Citing  institutional  parliamentary  features  in  several  countries,  he  concludes  that  the 
anllivalent  fltnrtinn  i+  narfnrmnd  hv  wnrkinn  &ss  oroanizations  in  Germany,  specifically  the  “~_“_‘“.”  ._. .” .._..  ,_  r-.  . _. . ..__  ‘,  ___. ._..  .=  s----------  -- 
unions  as  well  as  the  Social  Democratic  Party.  The  corresponding  passage  in his  political  essay 
on  “Parliament  and  Government  in  a Reordered  Germany”,  published  in  May  19 18,  after  the 
strike  wave  of  January,  1918,  predicts  that  the  unions  will  have  a difficult  disciplinary  task  in 
the  immediate  postwar  period,  as  they  attempt  to  cope  with  a  “syndicalism  of  immaturity”  which 
will  afflict  the  adolescents  who  had  been  drawn  into  the  production  process  by  wartime 
conditions  and  had  become  accustomed  to  unparalleled  wages  and  bargaining  power.  In  that 
context,  he  implicitly  specifies  the  kind  of  extra-political  organizational  contribution  that  unions 
make:  the  young,  war-recruited  workers  will  not  have  been  educated  to  “any  feelings  of 
solidarity  and  any  sort  of  usefulness  for  and  adaptibility  to  an  orderly  economic  struggle” 
(Weber  [ 192  11 1958:  392).  For  Weber,  unions  appear  economically  as  interest-generated  class 
formations  under  certain  conditions  of  competition  in the  labor  market,  in  the  context  of  the 
basic  power  asymmetries  involved  in  the  labor  contract.  Workers  under  capitalism  share  the 
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disparities  between  themselves  and  their  employers,  both  at  the  time  of  contracting  and  in  the 
conditions  of  dependent  work,  and  they  may  well  unite  for  collective  bargaining  where  their 
individual  market  positions  do  not  open  preferable  ways  of  serving  their  individual  interests. Subsequent  analyses  of  unions  in  the  Weberian  tradition  have  tended  to  generalize  further  on 
the  place  of  unions  in the  political  as  well  as  economic  rationalization  process,  in  line  with  the 
general  systematizing  of  his  more  historically  differentiated  (horizontally  unintegrated)  thinking. 
Unions  came  to  appear  central  to  the  progressive  integration  of  the  working  class  into  a 
procedurally  rational  pluralistic  process  of  political  interest  adjustment  (Bendix  1976, 
Schumpeter  1976).  and  to  the  rational  ordering  of  both  internal  and  external  labor  markets 
(Dunlop  and  Galenson  1978).  Like  Marx,  Weber  himself  feared  that  actual  working  class 
organizations  --  parties  perhaps  more  than  unions  --  were  in  fact  constantly  prone  to  pursue 
developmentally  irrational  policies.  He  worried  especially  about  their  inclinations  towards 
legislative  challenges  to  the  formal  rationality  of  law,  their  weakness  for  substantively  rational 
renderings  of  the  law  of  contract,  in  the  vain  hope  of  using  law  to  provide  “fair”  wages  or 
guarantee  against  exploitation  of  superior  bargaining  power.  These  misgivings  merge  with  his 
general  distrust  of  socialism  as  a political  movement. 
They  also  point  to  the  fundamental  contrast  between  the  Weberian  and  the  Durkheimian 
currents  in  progressivist  thinking  about  the  significance  of  unions  in the  course  of  social 
development.  For  the  latter  tendency,  the  emergence  of  coalitions  among  employers  and 
employees  and  the  conflictual  relations  between  them  presage  new  corporate  institutions 
regulating  their  collective  interrelationships  and  having  as their  eventual  legal  expression  a 
supercession  of  consensual  contracts  (and  the  morally  objectionable  property  system 
corresponding  to  them)  by  “just  contracts”  wherein  “the  sole  economic  inequalities  dividing  men 
are  those  resulting  from  the  inequality  of  their  services”  (Durkheim  I19501  1957:  2 14f.j.  On 
unions  in the  evolutionary  process,  Durkheim  writes  in The  Division  of  Labour:  -- 
The  only  groups  which  have  a certain  permanence  today  are  the  unions,  composed 
of  either  employers  or  workmen.  Certainly  there  is here  the  beginning  of 
occupational  organisation,  but  still  quite  formless  and  rudimentary.  For,  first,  a  union 
is  a private  association,  without  legal  authority,  and  consequently  without  any 
reguiatory  power.  Moreover,  the  number  of  unions  is  theoreticaiiy  iimitiess,  even 
within  the  same  industrial  category;  and  as  each  of  them  is  independent  of  the 
others,  if  they  do  not  federate  or  unify  there  is  nothing  intrinsic  in them  expressing 
the  unity  of  the  occupation  in  its  entirety.  Finally,  not  only  are  the  employers’  unions 
and  the  employees’  unions  distinct  from  each  other,  which  is  leqitimate  and necessary,  but  there  is  no  regular  contact  between  them.  There  exists  no  common 
organisation  which  brings  them  together,  where  they  can  develop  common  forms  of 
regulation  which  will  determine  the  relationships  between  them  in an  authoritative 
fashion,  without  either  of  them  losing  their  own  autonomy.  Consequently,  it  is  always 
the  rule  of  the  strongest  which  settles  conflict,  and  the  state  of  war  is  continuous. 
Save  for  those  of  their  actions  which  are  governed  by  common  moral  codes, 
employers  and  workers  are,  in relation  to  each  other,  in  the  same  situation  as  two 
autonomous  states,  but  of  unequal  power.  They  can  form  contracts,  as  nations  do 
through  the  medium  of  their  governments,  but  these  contracts  express  only  the 
respective  state  of  their  military  forces.  They  sanction  it  as  a condition  of  reality; 
they  cannot  make  it  legally  valid.  In  order  to  establish  occupational  morality  and  law  in 
the  different  economic  occupations,  the  corporation,  instead  of  remaining  a diffuse, 
disorganised  aggregate,  must  become  --  or  rather,  must  again  become  --  a  defined, 
organised  group;  in a word,  a public  institution.  (Durkheim  1972:  186-7) 
Durkheim,  like  Weber,  rejects  revolutionary  theories  of  socialism.  But  he  is  quite  content  to 
accept  the  concept  as  a projection  of  the  next  step  of  social  development: 
It  is  a question,  in  the  end,  of  knowing  whether  socialism  is  miraculous,  as  it 
imagines,  whether  it  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  our  societies,  or  whether  it accords 
with  their  own  natural  evolution,  so  that  it  does  not  have  to  destroy  them  in  order  to 
establish  itself.  It  is  to  this  latter  view  that  history  seems  to  me  to  point.  2 
The  subsequent  Durkheimian  tendency  of  progressivist  thinking  was  more  uncertain  about  the 
socialist  label,  given  its  widespread  political  identification  with  Marxism,  and  it  subtieized  the 
sense  in  which  the  relations  between  coalitions  of  employers  and  employees  were 
progressively  becoming  “public  institutions”,  with  the  development  of  conceptions  of  collective 
bargaining  labor  regimes  and  neo-corporatist  intermediations.  But  it  retains  the  strong  emphasis 
on  the  profoundly  integrative  functions  of  unions  and  their  central  bearing  upon  the  ethical 
quality  of  social  relations,  as  well  as  an  almost  Aristotelian  sense  of  the  causal  interlinkage 
between  these  two  dimensions  (Seiznick  1969). 
The  Marxist,  Weberian-rationalist,  and  Durkheimian-integrationist  theoretical  tendencies 
have  been  mingled  and  meshed  and  refined  in various  ways  during  the  twentieth  century,  of 
course,  but  they  variously  .contributed  to  a consensus  after  the  Second  World  War  that  trade Subsequent  analyses  of  unions  in  the  Weberian  tradition  have  tended  to  generalize  further  on 
the  place  of  unions  in the  political  as  well  as  economic  rationalization  process,  in  line  with  the 
general  systematizing  of  his  more  historically  differentiated  (horizontally  unintegrated)  thinking. 
Unions  came  to  appear  central  to  the  progressive  integration  of  the  working  class  into  a 
procedurally  rational  pluralistic  process  of  political  interest  adjustment  (Bendix  1976, 
Schumpeter  19761,  and  to  the  rational  ordering  of  both  internal  and  external  labor  markets 
(Dunlop  and  Galenson  1978).  Like  Marx,  Weber  himself  feared  that  actual  working  class 
organizations  --  parties  perhaps  more  than  unions  --  were  in  fact  constantly  prone  to  pursue 
developmentally  irrational  policies.  He  worried  especially  about  their  inclinations  towards 
legislative  challenges  to  the  formal  rationality  of  law,  their  weakness  for  substantively  rational 
renderings  of  the  law  of  contract,  in the  vain  hope  of  using  law  to  provide  “fair”  wages  or 
guarantee  against  exploitation  of  superior  bargaining  power.  These  misgivings  merge  with  his 
general  distrust  of  socialism  as  a political  movement. 
They  also  point  to  the  fundamental  contrast  between  the  Weberian  and  the  Durkheimian 
currents  in  progressivist  thinking  about  the  significance  of  unions  in the  course  of  social 
development.  For  the  latter  tendency,  the  emergence  of  coalitions  among  employers  and 
employees  and  the  conflictual  relations  between  them  presage  new  corporate  institutions 
regulating  their  collective  interrelationships  and  having  as  their  eventual  legal  expression  a 
supercession  of  consensual  contracts  (and  the  morally  objectionable  property  system 
corresponding  to  them)  by  “just  contracts”  wherein  “the  sole  economic  inequalities  dividing  men 
are  those  resulting  from  the  inequality  of  their  services”  (Durkheim  I1 9501  1957:  2 14f  .I.  On 
unions  in the  evolutionary  process,  Durkheim  writes  in The  Division  of  Labour:  -- 
The  only  groups  which  have  a certain  permanence  today  are  the  unions,  composed 
of  either  employers  or  workmen.  Certainly  there  is  here  the  beginning  of 
occupational  organisation,  but  still  quite  formless  and  rudimentary.  For,  first,  a  union 
is  a private  association,  without  legal  authority,  and  consequently  without  any 
regulatory  power.  Moreover,  the  number  of  unions  is  theoreticaiiy  iimitiess,  even 
within  the  same  industrial  category;  and  as  each  of  them  is  independent  of  the 
others,  if  they  do  not  federate  or  unify  there  is  nothing  intrinsic  in them  expressing 
the  unity  of  the  occupation  in  its  entirety.  Finally,  not  only  are  the  employers’  unions 
and  the  employees’  unions  distinct  from  each  other,  which  is  leqitimate  & union  participation  in  political  and  economic  designs  was  a settled  and,  in  principle,  progressive 
feature  of  the  institutional  makeup  of  a progressive  modernity.  Marxists  objected  to  trade 
unions  that  failed  to  subordinate  themselves  to  the  larger  strategic  objectives  of  class  struggle; 
Weberians  continued  to  worry  about  irrationally  ideological  modes  of  unionism;  and 
Durkheimians  likewise  attacked  the  notion  of  socialism  as  “miracle”  born  of  warlike  conflict.  But 
none  expected  unions  to  enter  into  a period  of  continued  and  seemingly  accelerating  decline. 
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present  arguably  symptomatic  downturn  of  unionism  in many  places  where  they  had  earlier 
considered  it  impregnable.  Our  thesis  is that  an  adequate  encounter  with  these  changes  must  call 
into  question  the  whole  idea  of  a progressivist  theoretical  strategy  comprehending  the 
relationship  between  social  progress  and  political  issues,  rather  than  adaptations  in  progressivist 
theories. 
The  Tendential  Decline  in  Trade  Unionism 
For  the  past  decade  or  longer,  trade  unions  have  been  measurably  in  decline  in a number 
of  the  industrially  advanced,  predominantly  capitalist  nations  with  comparatively  stable 
liberal-democratic  political  systems,  where  progressivist  ideologies  and  the  social  theories  upon 
which  they  selectively  draw  had  thought  them  not  only  secure  but  also  integral  to  social 
development.  This  decline  has  not  been  universal  or  uniform,  by  any  means,  but  it  is  substantial, 
sustained  and  wide-spread  enough  to  raise  serious  questions  about  established  progressivist 
expectations,  and  the  analyses  upon  which  they  rest.  We  will  draw  on  some  comparative 
analyses  of  deviant  cases  in the  attempt  to  derive  the  theoretical  lessons  from  the  general 
tendency.  We  will  also  look  briefly  at  the  corresponding  rise  and  strategic  importance  of  trade 
unions  in  several  authoritarian  states  with  comparatively  advanced  economic  systems,  in order 
to  test  our  approach  against  progressivist  claims  that  these  developments  can  serve  as  models 
for  revival  in the  nations  where  unions  are  in  decline.  Our  own  claim  overall  is  that  unions  can 
best  be  understood  as  strategic  political  entities  operating  within  interdependent  but  distinct 
action  contexts  of  polity  and  economy  whose  constitutional  and  systemic  features  they  can 
variously  influence  but  never  unilaterally  control.  Our  normative  premise  is  that  the  political 
argument  on  behalf  of  unions  that  is  hidden  within  the  progressivist  theories  is  eminently defensible  and  that  any  conclusion  that  unions  may  in  fact  no  longer  be  adaptable  to  the 
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problem,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  progressive  project.  If  social  progress  no  longer  causes 
unions  to  exist,  we  might  say,  it  may  be  necessary  to  invent  them  --  or  a functional  equivalent. 
The  tendential  decline  in  union  power  has  been  widely  observed  in  nations  with  both  of 
the  principal  types  of  industrial  relations  systems  commonly  distinguished  in  the  disciplines  of 
industrial  socioiogy  and  industrial  relations.  Specialists  broadly  distinguish  between  systems 
where  autonomous  trade  union  organizations  attempt  to  shape  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment  through  adversarial  collective  bargaining  at  the  level  of  firms  or  industries,  relying 
on  strikes  and  similar  job  actions  as  principal  sanctions,  and  “neo-corporatist”  or  participatory 
systems,  where  union  influence  is  exercised  through  autonomous  co-participation,  as  legitimate 
partners  of  associated  employers  and  state  agencies  in planning  and  regulatory  institutions  at 
various  levels  of  economic  organization.  Despite  important  exceptions,  at  least  at  the  present 
time,  the  most  common  observations  are  of  drastic  losses  of  power,  under  circumstances 
where  prospects  for  recovery  appear  uncertain  and  obscure.  The  indicators  of  decline  are 
different  in  each  context.  Unions  operating  in adversarial  collective  bargaining  systems  depend 
for  their  power  first  of  all  on  the  proportion  of  the  labor  market  that  is  unionized,  at  least  in 
decisive  sectors,  for  which  union  density,  i.e.,  the  proportion  of  the  non-agricultural  labor 
force  that  is  unionized,  is  a reasonably  reliable  measure.  In  neo-corporatist  contexts,  union 
density  is  less  directly  indicative  of  power,  not  least  because  measures  to  stabilize  less  than 
voluntary  memberships  are  a common  starting  point  for  neo-corporatist  arrangements.  In  these 
settings,  union  decline  is  measured,  first,  by  policy  failures  within  neo-corporatist  processes. 
Second,  and  more  importantly,  it  is  measured  by  the  reduced  saliency  of  those  processes 
within  the  decision-making  system:  decisions  are  pre-empted  by  actions  beyond  its  bounds  and 
the  institutions  in  which  unions  play  a  central  part  are  marginalized  without  necessarily  being 
changed. 
The  most  widely  noticed  sharp  drops  in  union  density  have  been  recorded  in the  United 
States  (from  a  high  of  36%  in  1945  to  19%  in  1984  and  estimates  closer  to  12%  at  the  present 
time),  Japan  (from  56%  in  1949  to  28%  .in  19861,  and  Britain  (from  55%  in  1979  to  37%  in 
1987).  Despite  all  that  has  been  said  about  the  unique  organization  and  discipline  of  the 
Japanese  labor  market,  its  unions  nevertheless  are  oriented  to  adversarial  collective  bargaining, like  the  other  two.  f Britain  had  been  a classical  case  of  union  strength,  where  the  basis  in 
adversarial  collective  bargaining  appeared  for  a while  strong  enough  to  open  the  planning  and 
regulatory  process  to  unions,  without  requiring  them  to  accept  the  measure  of  accommodation 
that  more  commonly  goes  together  with  the  neo-corporatist  pattern.  Strategic  efforts  to 
marginalize  collective  bargaining  within  firms  and  industries,  accompanied  by  state  actions 
inimical  to  former  bases  of  union  strength  appear  to  be  important  aspects  of  union  density 
decline  in  these  adversarial  collective  bargaining  contexts,  and  quite  possibly  a cause  of  such 
declines  in  unionization.  The  prime  factors  do  not  appear  to  be  simpie  labor  market 
transformations.  Such  extra-market  explanations  are  suggested  by  studies  of  present-day 
exceptions  to  the  trend.  Canada’s  situation,  greatly  resembling  that  of  the  United  States  and 
subject  to  most  of  the  same  economic  factors,  has  largely  held  gains  made  while  American 
density  rates  were  in  precipitous  decline.  Australia  too  displays  a collective-bargaining  oriented 
system  where  unions  remain  strong.  4 Progress  in the  poiiticai  economy,  and  especiaiiy  in  the 
world  market,  is  doubtless  extremely  important;  but  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  unions  in  the 
organized  responses  to  these  changes  depends  on  additional  social-political  factors,  according 
to  most  specialist  studies. 
The  decline  of  unions  oriented  to  neo-corporatist  relations  has  been  especially  marked  in 
the  Netherlands,  where  it  also  manifests  itself  in  steady,  serious  membership  losses,  and  in 
several  of  the  Scandinavian  countries,  except  Sweden,  although  membership  rates  have 
remained  relatively  stable.  Striking  neo-corporatist  experiments  in  Italy,  Spain  and  Belgium  have 
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increasing  recourse  to  improvized  adversarial  measures  with  comparatively  little  impact  under 
the  institutional  circumstances,  except  in  narrow  sectors  where  market  power  is  exceptionally 
strong.  West  Germany  is  a disputed  case:  union  membership  losses  have  been  slight  and 
important  co-participation  institutions  appear  intact,  but  unions  have  lost  influence  in  several  of 
these  institutions,  and  decisions  characteristically  central  to  union  concerns  are  being  shifted  to 
works’  councils  at  enterprise  levels,  where  union  voices  are  becoming  weaker.  Little  important 
leverage  is  exercised  by  agencies  with  an  autonomous  strategy  process  (e.g.  centralized  unions) 
and  with  an  independent  coercive  power  resource  (such  as  the  strike).  The  development  of 
labor  relations  into  a kind  of  firm-level  ‘producers’  syndicaiism’  implies  de  facto  deunionization,  -- 
many  observers  conclude,  even  if  this  is  temporarily-  masked  by  government  legislation facilitating  continued  union  membership.  5 As  in  the  adversarial  collective  bargaining  systems, 
there  are  good  reasons  for  emphasizing  the  strategic  actions  of  unions,  employers  and  public 
agencies  as  well  as  wider  systemic  changes,  especially  in  view  of  the  exceptions  found  in 
Sweden  and  Finland. 
In  dealing  with  these  contrasts  in  an  illustrative  case  study  of  the  contrast  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada,  Kettler,  Struthers,  and  Huxley  (19891  have  approached  the  wider 
problem  as  a  study  in  comparative  labor  reqimes,  rather  than  drawing  on  the  older, 
process-oriented  theoretical  conceptualizations  of  industrial  relations  and  related  sociological 
treatments.  By  the  concept,  also  adopted  here,  we  mean  the  power-constrained  but  inward&i-- 
contested  range  of  rules,  practices  and  expectations  that  organizes  the  labor  market.  The 
concept  attempts  to  integrate  the  elements  of  the  industrial  relations  system  with  the  elements 
of  its  public  policy  environment,  treating  the  whole  as  a partially-integrated,  conflictual, 
sectorially  diversified,  and  provisional  historical  formation,  produced  and  reproduced  by  the 
interplay  among  organized  economic  and  governmental  actors.  The  concept  illustrates,  in  our 
view,  the  type  of  complementary  conceptualization  which  we  believe  necessary  in  order  to 
acknowledge  the  horizontal  division  between  social  progress  and  progressive  projects  that 
progressivist  theoretical  formulations  obscure. 
As  employed  here,  the  term  “regime”  draws  on  two  distinct  usages.  While  lawyers  often 
use  it  to  refer  to  the  complex  of  juridified  regulations  governing  some  issue  domain,  recent 
international  relations  theory  has  broadened  and  deepened  the  concept.  The  distinctive  feature 
of  “regime”  in  the  latter  context,  and  the  feature  that  makes  this  conceptualization  of  interest  to 
us,  is  that  it  comprehends  not  only  the  quasi-legalistic  “principles,  norms,  rules  and 
decision-makers”  (Krasner  1982:  185)  around  which  the  expectations  of  the  relevant  political 
actors  converge  in  a given  issue  area  over  an  identifiable  period  of  time  but  also  the  power 
constellations  that  condition  the  effectiveness  of  the  institutionalized  order  in  question.  The 
institution  is  not  reduced  to  the  power  factors  and  the  power  factors  are  not  idealistically 
denied.  Among  students  of  international  relations,  the  point  of  the  concept  has  been  to  qualify 
the  monistic  “realism”  that  has  dominated  their  study  during  the  past  generation,  to  facilitate 
inquiry  into  the  causal  importance  of  quasi-legalized  institutions  where  and  when  they  can  be 
discerned,  without  denying  the  general  force  of  power-oriented  systemic  theory  (Keohane 
1986). In  adapting  the  concept  to  the  constitution  and  development  of  institutions  in  certain 
intranational  issue-areas,  the  point  is  rather  to  help  conceptualize  institutions  that  have  an 
irreducible  legal  component  but  that  are  shaped  in  important  measure  by  the  non-legal  power 
resources  that  participants  bring  into  play.  There  are  similarities  between  this  conceptualization 
and  Max  Weber’s  treatment  of  constitutional  law.  More  immediately  to  the  point,  in  the 
application  that  we  are  making  here,  is  the  parallel  between  such  “regimes”  and  the  collective 
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agreement  mat  forms  so  characteristic  a feature  of  the  employment  domain  during  the  period 
when  awareness  of  industrial  relations  as  a distinctive  issue-domain  and  object  of  analysis  grew 
in  importance  (Kettler  1987:  9-47).  In  our  work,  then,  the  lawyer’s  “regime”  provides  the 
starting  point  for  analysis,  but  the  complex  of  norms  and  regulations  is  understood 
“realistically”,  in  conjunction  with  the  competing  political  designs  and  clashing  power  resources 
at  work  in the  field.  A  regime  is  a response  to  social  progress,  not  simply  a manifestation  of  it. 
As  a  constituted  pattern,  a regime  embodies  a measure  of  resistance  to  disruptive 
change;  it  places  constraints  upon  the  forms  and  exercises  of  power  deployed;  but  both  of 
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from  time  to  time  in  the  life  of  a regime.  A  regime  may  be  said  to  intend  a preferred  type  of 
outcome,  but  this  teleological  design  will  be  manifested  in  a structural  tendency,  subject  to  even 
quite  important  exceptions,  and  not  in  a purely  instrumental  machinery.  To  function  as  a regime, 
it  must  be  accorded  a measure  of  legitimacy  by  all  participant  actors,  and  this  is  rarely 
consistent  with  transparently  one-sided  utilities.  Regimes  differ  as  to  complexity,  flexibility,  and 
tolerance  for  inner  inconsistency  or  conflict.  But  they  all  display  that  visible  blend  of  legal 
manner  and  power  factors  that  mark  international  law,  which  was  the  paradigm  for  the 
international  relations  theorists’  version  of  the  concept,  and  which  has,  in  fact,  been  earlier 
used  as  a model  for  the  analysis  of  labour  law,  realistically  understood  in  its  social 
effectiveness  (Korsch  1972:  142f  f .I. 
In the  study  of  labour,  then,  regime  refers  to  the  institutionalized  political  organization  of 
labour  markets  (Offe  1984:  95ff.1,  comprising  the  patterned  interactions  among  state  (and 
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however  severally  articulated.  The  degrees  and  forms  of  organization  of  the  latter  two  types  of 
actors  will  obviously  make  a decisive  difference  for  the  shape  of  the  regime  concerned.  Our 
proposed  conceptual  shift  is  designed  to  facilitate  inquiry  into  the  political  dynamics  of  any  such regime  as  well  as  into  its  historical  sources  and  competitors.  In  locating  legal  and  administrative 
designs  within  regimes,  in  short,  we  mean  to  emphasize  their  direct  relationships  with  the 
patterns  of  practice  by  the  principal  parties  in  the  industrial  relations  interaction,  to  show  that 
these  are  integral  to  the  patterns,  as  well  as  their  relationship  with  the  political  constellations 
constituted  by  the  direct  involvement  of  these  parties  in  political  life  (see,  for  example,  the 
treatment  of  the  “organizational  practice”  of  the  German  labour  movement  in  Loesche  1982). 
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differences  in the  outlooks  and  activities  of  unions  and  employers,  for  example,  serving  as 
factors  in the  political  makeup  of  the  regimes.  Kochan  and  his  associates  have  recently 
developed  valuable  materials  for  the  United  States,  especially  for  the  study  of  “strategic 
choices”  by  employers  (Kochan  1986).  For  obvious  reasons,  our  present  analysis  will 
concentrate  rather  on  the  regime-constitutive  politics  of  unions. 
For  purposes  of  the  present  theoretical  exercise  we  should  be  prepared  to  conceive  the 
possibility  of  declines  in  unionization  and  union  power  so  drastic  that  unions  are  almost 
everywhere  marginalized  in  the  labor  regime  --  in  the  public  ordering  of  the  labor  market  --  and 
reduced  to  ghettoized  interest  groups  in the  political  field.  Our  present  theoretical  objective 
requires  neither  a demonstration  that  the  phenomenon  of  decline  is  universal  nor  does  it  require 
a universal  explanation  for  it.  But  we  consider  it  theoretically  instructive  and  practically 
important  to  know  whether  and  how  it  matters  that  such  a development  is  occurring  in 
important  places.  What  would  it  mean  if  there  were  no  more  unions?  We  take  issue  with  Alain 
Touraine’s  contention  that  “the  loss  of  strength  of  American  or  French  unions,  the  serious 
problems  met  by  British  and  Italian  ones,  are  in  the  end  no  more  significant  than  the 
effectiveness  of  the  Swedish  and  German  labor  organizations,  the  current  expansion  of 
Brazilian  unions,  and  the  central  role  played  by  the  Solidarnosc  union  in the  Polish  democratic, 
social,  and  national  liberation  movement”  because  unions  have  ceased  to  be  a “social  movement” 
and  have  become  merely  a  “political  force”  with  contingently  changing  fortunes”  (Touraine 
19861. 
This  is  a major  critical  issue  that  is,  in  our  view,  so  poorly  served  by  analyses  derived 
from  progressivist  Marxist  approaches  oriented  to  the  central  problem  of  relating  unions  to  a 
schematic  conception  of  the  destined  place  of  workers’  self-organization  in  the  movement 
towards  revolution  or  to  a  schematic  conception  about  the  revolutionary  vocation  of  class conscious  workers.  A  prominent  theme  in  contemporary  Marxist  or  quasi-Marxist  analyses  has 
been  the  claim  that  union  decline  can  be  traced  to  a dissipation  of  radical  class-mobilization 
capabilities  through  the  organizations’  complicity  in the  juridification  (Verrechtlichung)  of 
collective  labor  activity.  6 Our  analysis  assigns  a politically  significant  constitutive  role  to  the 
regime  developments  that  are  stigmatized  in this  way.  They  have  been  essential  contributions  to 
the  formation  of  the  politically  democratic  welfare  states  of  the  past  generation,  many  of  them 
at  least  tendentially  socially  democratic  as  well,  and  there  is  no  reason  for  confidence  in what 
might  take  their  place  (see  Offe,  1984:  95ff.,  1985.  Cp.  also  Streeck,  1987  and 
Miller-Jentsch,  1987).  Precisely  because  the  welfare  state  may  have  been  rendered  obsolete 
because  it  is  so  intimately  tied  to  an  unsustainable  (and  unconscionable)  exploitation  of  ethnic  or 
national  privilege  and  of  the  eco-system,  the  possible  demise  of  a prime  historic  resource  of 
democratic  politics  and  collective  self-management  must  be  discussed  without  the  constraints 
of  schematic  scenarios  of  a fixed  order  of  social  change. 
An  interesting  light  is thrown  upon  union  decline  in representative  countries  of  the  First 
World  by  the  bursts  of  union  strength  in  other  kinds  of  countries,  as  will  be  shown  below. 
Illustrative  cases  are  the  rise  of  Black  unionism  in  South  Africa,  massive  protests  on  behalf  of 
independent  unions  in  South  Korea,  and  Solidarnosc  in Poland.  Although  these  are  often  dealt 
with  in  Marxist  terms,  especially  the  first,  the  juxtaposition  of  all  three  and  the  problem  of 
relating  them  to  the  larger  discussion  required  by  the  situation  of  unions  noted  above  combine 
to  make  such  an  approach  impiausibie.  Such  instances  of  unions  that  fiaunt  some  of  the 
ideological  signs  that  Marxist  and  Marxist-derived  progressivism  take  as  emblematic  of  the 
undistorted  progressive  functions  of  the  institution  must  rather  be  understood  in the  context  of 
their  struggles  against  repressive  states  and  the  quasi-unions  that  are  their  creatures.  Such 
unions,  we  will  try  to  show  below,  are  attempting  to  secure  collective-bargaining-oriented  labor 
regimes  that  will  allow  them  to  play  precisely  the  kinds  of  constitutive  roles  that  are  now  in 
trouble  in the  richer  countries  and  that  Marxist  analysts  deprecate,  and  their  attempts  must  be 
understood  in  the  context  of  the  obstacles  and  opportunities  provided  by  the  labor  regimes  in 
place. 
While  Marxist  progressivism  responds  to  the. present  situation  with  its  characteristic 
ambivalence,  fluctuating  between  a satisfied  registration  of  the  failure  of  a unionism  that  failed 
to  meet  its  revolutionary  developmental  task  and  misjudged  surge  of  approbation  for  a unionism that  appears  to  be  sufficiently  universalistic  in  its  designs,  Weberian  and  Durkheimian  types  of 
progressivist  social  theory  are  more  nearly  inclined  to  accept  the  apparent  verdict  of  the  latest 
stage  of  social  progress.  In the  Weberian  tradition,  rationality  is  increasingly  seen  to  speak 
against  collective  action  in  the  labor  market.  Unions  are  declining,  on  this  view,  above  all 
because  they  no  ionger  contribute  to  the  rationai  pursuit  of  workers’  interests  and  because  they 
are  harmful  to  the  rationality  of  economic  organization  and  public  policy  (Olsen  1986,  Rogers 
1988).  The  Durkheimian  line  of  progressivist  thinking  is  more  divided,  as  might  be  imagined, 
with  some  writers  anticipating  a further  adaptation  of  unions  to  the  new  integrative 
requirements  of  emerging  highly  differentiated  organizations  of  social  reproduction  (Teubner 
1978)  and  others  accepting  the  growing  obsolescence  of  unions  as  these  new  organizations 
develop  more  fully  adequate  novel  normative  institutions.  Since  all three  of  these  traditions 
embody  irreplacable  strands  of  analytical  insight  into  social  progress,  they  clearly  have 
important  contributions  to  make  to  an  understanding  of  the  developmental  tendencies  that 
militate  against  unionism.  Nevertheless,  we  find  that  these  insights  cannot  be  rendered 
productive  in  isolation  from  one  another,  and  we  propose  to  give  them  their  place  within  our 
study  of  transformations  in  labor  regimes.  Insisting  upon  the  horizontal  division  introduced 
above,  regime  analysis  complements  analytical  study  of  social  progress  with  diagnosis  of 
political  possibilities  and  assesment  of  political  objectives.  Its  perspective  is  strategic.  That 
does  not  mean  that  we  absolutize  the  value  of  unions  or  guarantee  recipes  for  their  revival.  Our 
analysis  will  have  a  far  more  indeterminate  outcome,  leaving  much  for  informed  political  choice 
and  leaving  much  to  unpredictable  political  conflicts.  But  we  will  not  let  presumed  laws  of  social 
progress  preempt  those  choices  or  obviate  those  conflicts. 
The  decline  of  labor  unions,  where  it  is  most  marked,  is  a concomitant  of  what  is 
variously  called  the  “crisis  of  the  welfare  state”  or  the  “end  of  the  century  of  social  democracy” 
(Kettler  1987).  from  the  standpoint  of  economic  analysis,  the  central  phenomenon  is  said  to  be 
the  contradiction  between  contemporary  market  imperatives  and  unions’  inherent  preoccupation 
with  shop-floor  due  process,  job  protection,  and  increments  in  labor’s  distributive  shares 
across  the  market.  All  three  of  these  preoccupations  made  eminent  sense  to  the  Weberian  and 
Durkheimian  types  of  theoretical  approaches,  understood  either  as  a structural  contributor  to 
the  rationalization  of  internal  labor  markets  and  expansionary  factor  in aggragate  demand,  quite 
apart  from  its  political  latent  functions,  or  as  a qualitative  contributor  to  the  cooperative  ethos that  appears  to  be  sufficiently  universalistic  in  its  designs,  Weberian  and  Durkheimian  types  of 
progressivist  social  theory  are  more  nearly  inclined  to  accept  the  apparent  verdict  of  the  latest 
stage  of  social  progress.  In  the  Weberian  tradition,  rationality  is  increasingly  seen  to  speak 
against  collective  action  in  the  labor  market.  Unions  are  declining,  on  this  view,  above  all 
because  they  no  longer  contribute  to  the  rational  pursuit  of  workers’  interests  and  because  they 
are  harmful  to  the  rationality  of  economic  organization  and  public  policy  (Olsen  1986,  Rogers 
1988).  The  Durkheimian  line  of  progressivist  thinking  is  more  divided,  as  might  be  imagined, 
with  some  writers  anticipating  a  further  adaptation  of  unions  to  the  new  integrative 
requirements  of  emerging  highly  differentiated  organizations  of  social  reproduction  (Teubner 
1978)  and  others  accepting  the  growing  obsolescence  of  unions  as  these  new  organizations 
develop  more  fully  adequate  novel  normative  institutions.  Since  all  three  of  these  traditions 
embody  irreplacable  strands  of  analytical  insight  into  social  progress,  they  clearly  have 
important  contributions  to  make  to  an  understanding  of  the  developmental  tendencies  that 
militate  against  unionism.  Nevertheless,  we  find  that  these  insights  cannot  be  rendered 
productive  in  isolation  from  one  another,  and  we  propose  to  give  them  their  place  within  our 
study  of  transformations  in  labor  regimes.  Insisting  upon  the  horizontal  division  introduced 
above,  regime  analysis  complements  analytical  study  of  social  progress  with  diagnosis  of 
political  possibilities  and  assesment  of  political  objectives,  Its  perspective  is  strategic.  That 
does  not  mean  that  we  absolutize  the  value  of  unions  or  guarantee  recipes  for  their  revival.  Our 
analysis  will  have  a  far  more  indeterminate  outcome,  leaving  much  for  informed  political  choice 
and  leaving  much  to  unpredictable  political  conflicts.  But  we  will  not  let  presumed  laws  of  social 
progress  preempt  those  choices  or  obviate  those  conflicts. 
The  decline  of  labor  unions,  where  it  is  most  marked,  is  a concomitant  of  what  is 
variously  called  the  “crisis  of  the  welfare  state”  or  the  “end  of  the  century  of  social  democracy” 
(Kettler  1987).  From  the  standpoint  of  economic  analysis,  the  central  phenomenon  is  said  to  be 
the  contradiction  between  contemporary  market  imperatives  and  unions’  inherent  preoccupation 
with  shop-floor  due  process,  job  protection,  and  increments  in  labor’s  distributive  shares 
across  the  market.  All  three  of  these  preoccupations  made  eminent  sense  to  the  Weberian  and 
Durkheimian  types  of  theoretical  approaches,  understood  either  as  a structural  contributor  to 
the  rationalization  of  internal  labor  markets  and  expansionary  factor  in  aggragate  demand,  quite 
apart  from  its  political  latent  functions,  or  as  a qualitative  contributor  to  the  cooperative  ethos of  productive  units,  notwithstanding  the  conflictual  motif,  and  as  contributor  to  a  self-regulating 
situationally  adequate  complex  of  integrative  social  institutions.  From  a Marxist  perspective,  as 
noted,  the  normalization  of  trade  union-oriented  labor  regimes  represented  an  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  the  formation  of  a revolutionary  class-conscious  proletariat  --  a pattern  earlier 
denounced  as  “economism”  and  imperialist  opportunism  by  labor  elites  by  Lenin  and  later,  more 
subtly,  analyzed  as  integral  to  an  extended  phase  of  “corporate  liberalism”  --  although  the 
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rests. 
The  most  powerful  social  progress  elements  in  the  explanation  of  this  decline  refer  to 
production  and  labor  market  changes  inimical  to  historic  patterns  of  unionization  and  union 
action.  The  rise  of  service  industries  and  the  technological  transformation  of  production 
industries  shift  the  labor  force  into  occupational  groupings,  work  structures,  and  geographical 
settings  where  the  characteristic  contractual  patterns  and  implementation  techniques  of  historic 
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large  minimum-wage  ghetto  in tendentially  dualized  labor  markets  multiply  this  de-unionization 
effect  (Berger  and  Piore  1980).  Intense  international  competition  from  and  cooperation  with 
nations  with  labor  regimes  antithetical  to  unionism  increases  the  demand  for  “flexibility”  in the 
organization  df  work  in  nations  with  union  traditions  and  largely  dissipates  former  economic  or 
organizational  benefits  that  resulted  from  industrial  relations  oriented  to  collectlve  bargalnlng, 
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and  Sabel  1985). 
But  the  differential  rise  and  decline  of  unions  in  economically  comparable  nations,  as 
well  as  more  general  theoretical  considerations,  make  us  question  the  sufficiency  of  such 
analyses  at  the  level  of  economic  development  alone.  Organizational  and  political  factors  shape 
the  capacity  of  union-oriented  labor  regimes  to  manage  the  new  economic  developments.  These 
must  be  examined  in  order  to  explain  the- widespread  reorientation  away  from  unions.  From  the 
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for  changed  patterns  of  consequences;  they  don’t  suffice  as  determinants.  Labor  regimes  are 
constituted  by  patterned  interplay  among  three  categories  df  collective  actors:  employees, employers,  and  state  agencies.  For  present  purposes  we  must  disregard  the  important  fact  that 
each  of  these  categories  is  by  no  means  homogeneous  or  undivided,  a radical  simplification 
since  the  very  concept  of  labor  regime  points  to  the  sectorially  differentiated  character  of  the 
institutionalized  relationships  comprehended  by  the  concept.  Speaking  generally  and 
concentrating  on  the  sectors  where  unions  have  been  most  important,  we  can  nevertheless 
avoid  egregious  error.  Characteristic  changes  affecting  each  of  the  three  actors  help  to  explain 
the  present  changes  in  the  pattern  to  the  detriment  of  unions. 
State  agencies  active  in  the  labor  regime  are  changing  their  pattern  of  conduct  in  a 
number  of  ways  in  response  to  political  redirection  from  government  leaders  committed  to 
business-led  economic  restructuring.  Some  influential  observers  trace  these  shifts  to  Ideological 
changes  in  public  opinion,  but  such  analyses  appear  seriously  overstated  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
unions  are  no  more  popular  in  many  of  the  nations  where  they  have  retained  their  comparative 
strength  than  they  are  where  they  are  in  rapid  decline.  More  to  the  point,  no  doubt,  are  such 
things  as  elite  perceptions  of  failures  in  the  “policy-ideas”  historically  linked  to  unions  Walelly 
19891,  delegitimations  of  existing  regulatory  patterns  in  the  course  of  the  ‘6Os,  the  dramatic 
shifts  in  the  balance  of  power  between  “economy”  and  “polity”  resulting  from  the 
internationalized  economy  and  the  enormous  scale  and  power  of  capital  combines,  the 
weakening  of  state  revenues  and  apparatuses  attending  the  demands  of  the  institutionalized 
welfare  state  under  conditions  of  massive  unproductive  military  investment  for  many  of  them, 
and  the  immeasurable  investments  required  by  contemporary  means  of  production.  New  state 
actions  in  the  interactions  constitutive  of  labor  regimes  include  express  interventions  to  weaken 
existing  union  organizations  (and  their  material  and  ideological  power  resources),  as  in  Britain,  or 
easing  of  enforcement  against  violators  of  regulations  designed  to  uphold  the  regime,  as  in  the 
United  States.  In  both  kinds  of  labor  regimes,  an  important  development  is  the  shift  in  the 
constitution  of  public  policy  so  that  key  matters  are  no  longer  decided  in  the  context  of  the 
labor  regime.  The  shift  is  especially  easy  to  observe  where  the  labor  regime  tends  towards  the 
neo-corporatist  model,  as  in  the  Netherlands,  because  there  the  consultative  bodies  are  quite 
visibly  not  consulted.  It  is  no  less  important,  however,  in  the  other  model,  as  when  trade 
regulations  preempt  the  field  of  decisions  affecting  the  labor  market  --  a  present  prospect  in 
Canada  and  an  impending  prospect  throughout  the  European  Economic  Community  after  1992. The  actions  of  employers  cannot  be  understood  simply  as  a parallelogram  of  economic 
forces.  The  exceptional  cases,  whether  national  units  like  Sweden  and  Australia  or  sectorial 
exceptions  like  the  American  native  auto  industry  or  the  Canadian  steel  industry,  indicate  that  the 
market-impelled  productivity-enhancing  adjustments  can  even  be  furthered  by  collective 
bargaining  arrangements  under  certain  circumstances.  But  the  widespread  strategic  design  is to 
regain  intra-organizational  control  and  especially  to  bound  and  internalize  the  communications 
system,  disencumbering  it  from  the  uncertainties  of  power-constrained  negotiations,  which 
always  carry  the  risk  of  requiring  the  internalization  of  externalities  that  can  otherwise  be 
shifted  alsewhere.  The  new  concerted  widespread  resistance  to  unionism  and  unionization  in a 
number  of  nations  must  be  seen  as  a result  of  strategic  decisions  (Kochan  et  al.  1986a,  1986b, 
Fiorito  et  al.  19871,  frequently  involving  considerable  short-run  costs  in  new  social  technologies 
of  human  resources  management,  as  in the  United  States,  or  material  inducements  to  bring 
co-participation  mechanisms  out  of  union  control,  as  in Germany.  In  Weberian  terms,  these  are 
investments  in power  rather  than  direct  exercises  in  economic  rationality,  collective  goods 
purchased  at  immediate  cost,  on  the  basis  of  historical  experience  and  imprecise  prospective 
calculations  (Hardin  1982). 
In trying  to  understand  the  changing  role  of  unions  it  is  important  to  consider  questions 
of  their  organization  and  strategy.  Their  weakening  within  the  labor  regime  is  not  a matter  of 
declining  memberships  alone,  because  membership  levels  are  quite  commonly  a  function  of  the 
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they  make  of  the  power  they  have.  This  is  evident  from  the  record  of  mass  unionization,  which 
did  not  begin  in  Germany,  Britain,  and  the  United  States,  for  example,  until  it  was  either 
promoted  by  government  labor  force  planners  during  World  War  I or  by  post-war  successor 
states  as  organizing  devices  amenable  to  exchanges  helpful  to  demobilization  and 
reconstruction,  and  which  was  similarly  served  by  World  War  II and  its  aftermath.  It  is  also 
suggested  by  the  deviant  cases  at  the  present  time.  But  in  all  these  cases,  the  point  is  not  simply 
that  “the  state”  wanted  unions  for  its  own  purposes;  rather,  it  is  that  unionism  as  an  institution 
appeared  effective  enough  to  be  so  wanted.  Nor  should  it  be  thought  that  governmental  designs 
invariably  achieved  their  purposes  without  major  costs.  This  particular  occasion  is  clearly  not 
the  place  for  political  commentary  on  the  makeup  and  policies  of  unions  throughout  the  First 
World.  We  simply  want  to  register  our  conviction  that  such  commentary  is  not  at  all  beside  the point,  that  the  strength  of  unions  within  the  labor  regime  depends  in  some  significant  measure 
on  what  they  in  fact  do  (Huxley  et  al.  1986). 
Wolfgang  Streeck  (198  1) has  clearly  formulated  the  central  organizational  problem 
confronting  unions:  they  must  somehow  deal,  under  ever  more  differentiated  circumstances, 
with  their  dual  nature  as  organizations  that  must  simultaneously  make  good  as  rational  actors  in 
complex  rationalized  relationships  and  as  inspirers  of  solidaristic  enthusiasm  among  their  actual 
and  potential  members.  Formulated  in  Weberian  language,  Streeck’s  thesis  is  that  they  must 
constantly  reproduce  both  rational-legal  and  charismatic  legitimacy,  although  we  might  prefer  to 
say  that  they  must  combine  the  characteristics  that  have  been  singled  out  respectively  by  the 
Weberian  and  Durkheimian  theoretical  models.  All  labor  regimes  are  importantly  conditioned  by 
the  unions’  needs  in  these  respects,  since  the  other  two  actors  control  resources  that  may  be 
vital  to  unions  in  their  struggle  for  organizational  effectiveness  (or  survival).  This  is  an  important 
source  of  that  obsessive  preoccupation  with  the  organization  and  those  compromises  for  the 
sake  of  the  organization  that  are  the  despair  of  radical  opponents  and  observers,  and  that  too 
often  are  interpreted  (and  denounced)  in  purely  moralistic  terms,  especially  in  the  Marxist 
tradition. 
Cella’s  and  Treu’s  typology  of  union  formations  can  help  us  to  distinguish  the  factors 
that  inhibit  the  strategic  responses  of  different  kinds  of  unions  under  present  conditions  and 
seemingly  increasingly  limit  their  abilities  to  protect  union-supportive  labor  regimes  under  so 
many  emerging  conditions.  Of  five  types  of  unions  distinguished  by  Cella  and  Treu,  three 
models  are  principally  represented  in  the  adversarial  and  neorcorporatist  labor  regimes  now 
under  consideration:  business  unionism,  competitive  unionism,  and  participatory  unionism  (Cella 
and  Treu,  1982:  Ch.  10).  7 The  first  type  is  distinguished  by  its  narrowly  economic  objectives, 
its  comparative  distance  from  stable  political  commitments,  and  reliance  on  workplace 
organization;  the  second  type  is  marked  by  wider  social  objectives,  more  conflictual 
orientations,  and  closer  ties  with  political  organizations;  and  the  third  type  is  geared  to 
neo-corporatist  participation  in  designs  for  public  economic  policy.  We  shall  equate  each  type 
with  a  characteristic  strategic  pattern  and  indicate  difficulties  confronting  each  of  the  strategies 
in  question. 
Business  unions  depend  on  collective  bargaining  results  to  legitimate  themselves  as 
rational  guardians  of  members’  interests  and  on  adversarial  mobilization,  especially  through strikes,  to  provide  for  solidarity.  They  are  dramatically  weakened  in  regard  to  the  rational-legal 
dimensions  of  legitimacy  by  unfavorable  developments  in  labor  markets  and  public  policy  and  by 
employer  deployment  of  full  powers  of  resistance;  they  can  be  decisively  undermined  in their 
principal  source  of  charismatic  legitimacy  by  the  adjustments  they  make  to  respond  to  the 
former  problem,  as  well  as  by  shifts  in the  ideological  field  importantly  affected  by  state 
actors. 
Competitive  unions  depend  to  a considerable  extent  on  the  vitality  and  loyalty  of  the 
political  parties  with  which  they  are  typically  allied,  commonly  labor  or  social  democratic  parties. 
Party  leaders,  ideologies,  and  mobilization  campaigns  can  reinforce  the  solidaristic  components 
of  their  inner  legitimacy.  As  factors  in government,  in competitive  opposition  or  as 
coalition-members,  the  parties  are  also  their  principal  levers  for  securing  support  from  state 
agencies  wtthin  the  collective  interchanges  constituting  the  labor  regime,  thereby  strengthening 
their  capacity  to  meet  members’  interests.  Although  there  is  clearly  a great  measure  of 
reciprocal  dependency,  the  strength  of  the  relevant  parties  is  by  no  means  exclusively 
dependent  on  the  independent  strength  of  unions.  A  central  feature  of  several  of  the 
exceptions  to  the  phenomenon  of  general  decline  is  the  exceptional  continuing  strength  of  the 
allied  political  parties,  as  has  been  true  of  the  Swedish  and  Finnish  Social  Democrats,  as  well  as 
the  labor  parties  in  several  of  the  historically  white  Commonwealth  nations,  where  these  parties 
have  not  bought  their  continuing  strength,  as  in  Southern  Europe,  by  substantially  downgrading 
their  alliances  with  unions.  The  more  general  trend  away  from  social  democracy  and  laborism  in 
the  political  domain  (and  the  renewed  militancy  against  them)  is  a key  problem  for  the 
competitive  unions  (Dunn,  1984). 
Participatory  unions  have  historically  relied  on  alliances  in  government,  whether  through 
parties  or  other  routes  of  access,  to  give  them  sufficient  leverage  to  count  independently  in  the 
comparatively  non-adversarial  dealings  with  employers  that  are  characteristic  of  the 
neo-corporatist  designs  in  which  they  take  form.  Their  legitimacy  depends  on  their  evident 
functionai  efficacy,  but  their  quasi-officiai  status  aiso  makes  them  organizationaiiy  iess 
dependent  on  legitimacy.  They  are  being  seriously  harmed  in many  places  by  an  abrupt  and 
continuing  loss  of  governmental  allies  and  by  an  appropriation  of  their  functions  by  competing 
agencies  fostered  by  employers,  as  exemplified  by  the  widening  split  between  unions  and 
co-participation  institutions  in Germany.  * Under  these  circumstances,  their  attempts  to  retain neo-corporatist  linkages  may  also  jeopardize  the  loyalty  and  discipline  of  their  membership, 
leading  to  wildcat  direct  actions  by  groups  advantageously  situated  in  narrow  labor  market 
niches,  as  illustrated  by  the  the  case  of  air  traffic  controllers  in  Italy.  Such  actions  further 
undermine  the  co-participatory  institutions  upon  which  this  strategy  depends. 
If  the  labor  regime  is  the  provisional  institutionalization  of  these  interrelationships, 
embodied  in  broadly  legalized  designs,  as  well  as  policies,  we  can  speak  of  a tendential 
de-unionization  of  iabor  regimes  and  inquire  into  the  importance  of  such  a development  not  only 
with  regard  to  the  presumed  processes  of  social  development  but  also  with  regard  to  the 
repertory  of  politlcal  responses  to  these  processes.  Our  argument  is  that  failure  to  appreciate 
the  political  importance  of  unions  and  the  importance  of  strategies  for  affecting  that 
importance  leads  to  misleadingly  progressivist  ideological  interpretations  of  our  times. 
4.  Unions  and  the  Progressive  Project 
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of  unionism  is  recognized,  the  problem  moves  out  of  the  contexts  of  industrial  relations  or 
labor  economics  as  well  as  Marxist  social  theory.  At  issue  is  the  political  significance  of  labor 
regimes  centered  on  labor  market  conflict-resolution  mechanisms  involving  collective  actors  -- 
trade  unions  and  employers  of  dependent  labor  --  that  are  more  or  less  autonomous.  The 
contingent,  political  relationships  to  the  state  are  not  peripheral  to  the  theoretical  treatment  of 
the  social  interactions  mistakenly  comprehended  as  elements  of  a progressivist  movement  (Cp. 
Erd  and  Scherer,  1985:  pp.  1 15ff.,  esp.  128-  131).  Labor  regimes  oriented  to  unions,  we  shall 
argue,  have  made  a vital  and  distinctive  contribution  to  the  constitution  of  dynamic  democratic 
constitutions,  even  where  the  unions  pursued  quite  narrow  programs.  Unions  in  labor  regimes 
that  peripheralize  or  ghettoize  their  activities,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  positively  harmful  to 
social  justice  or  other  objectives  of  social  democratization,  unless  they  make  the  reconstitution 
of  the  labor  regime  central  to  their  strategy.  Political  judgments  concerning  unions,  in  short,  are 
difficult,  uncertain,  and  context-dependent.  But  they  cannot  be  made  on  the  basis  of 
progressivist  social  theory. 
Turning  first  to  the  historical  contribution  of  trade-unions  during  the  struggle  for 
trade-union  oriented  labor  regimes,  we  want  to  emphasize  two  kinds  of  contributions  to  the production  and  reproduction  of  working  democratic  orders,  one  relating  to  the  generation  of 
political  conflict  and  the  other  relating  to  the  transformation  of  the  legal  order.  Unlike  Marxist 
analysts,  our  interest  here  is  concentrated  in the  first  place  on  political  effects  that  are  arguably 
concomitants  of  the  mrnimal  designs  of  unionism  rather  than  on  political  effects  that  depend  on 
express  political  projects  oriented  by  egalitarian  political  ideologies,  although  we  do  not  deny 
contingent  positive  correlations  between  the  two.  We  want  generalizations  that  apply  to  the 
founder  years  of  Samuel  Gompers’  AFL  as  well  as  Carl  Legien’s  social  democratic  trade  union 
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alike,  during  the  organizing  period  prior  to  the  labor  regime  crisis  that  has  been  spreading  since 
the  late  1960s. 
First,  then,  unions  have  served  to  activate  and  reproduce  democratic  politics  because 
therr  activities  institutionalize  the  political  agenda  items  of  power  sharing  and  economic 
distribution.  This  does  not  mean  that  they  have  been  necessarily  or  even  commonly  dedicated  to 
egalitarian  objectives  in  these  regards.  The  point  we  are  making  need  not  be  harmed  by  the 
recognition  that  unions  have  often  pursued  quite  particularistic  policies  under  these  regimes, 
seeking  privileged  access  to  privileges  rather  than  the  abolition  of  privileges.  As  principal 
players  in  a labor  regime,  their  activities  and  conditions  of  existence  have  nevertheless  implied 
generalizable  politics-forming  issues  that  ramify  beyond  the  unions’  manifest  purposes  or  those 
of  their  competitors  or  antagonists,  rendering  all  settlements  provisional,  while  reproducing 
contests  and  choices.  The  Marxist  tradition  of  commentary  has  misconstrued  this,  taking  it  as  a 
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universality;  but  it  is  time  to  conclude  that  there  has  never  been  such  a univocal  logic.  The 
unified  labor  movement  has  always  been  more  a matter  of  internal  collective  bargaining  than 
solidaristic  common  consciousness,  notwithstanding  periods  during  whih  the  bargaining  was 
conducted  in  a shared  ideological  vocabulary.  Although  there  is  a record  of  affinity  between 
unionism  and  mass  democratic  parties  in many  places,  the  politics  of  those  parties  has  been  a 
matter  of  cultural  history  and  changing  situational  patterns.  9 
In  this  connection,  we  are  not  arguing  merely,  with  S.  M.  Lipset,  that  unions  have 
contributed  to  a  oluralistic  political  field  that  limits  the  powers  of  all.  Twentieth-century  r~-  - 
democracy,  in our  view,  is  about  economic  distribution  and  power  sharing,  not  about  effective 
system  maintenance  and  limitations  of  governmental  power.  Unions  in  union-oriented  labor regimes  have  not  been  simply  one  of  a  multiplicity  of  interest  groups.  By  virtue  of  their 
projects,  they  have  been  structurally  linked  to  the  generation  of  the  distinctively  democratic 
issues.  The  rise  of  nineteenth-and  twentieth-century  democracy  is  inseparable  from  the 
emergence  of  the  “social  question”,  and  unions  have  given  organizational  expression  to  that 
question,  forcing  it  onto  all  political  agendas,  whether  or  not  their  own  strategy  has  addressed 
it  in  an  effective  or  defensible  way. 
Second,  unionism  has  contributed  to  democracy  because  it  initiated  and  occasioned 
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more  open  to  democratically  generated  demands  and  self-regulation.  The  characteristic 
institutions  relevant  here  are  the  collective  agreement  and  other  quasi-juridified  multi-partite 
negotiating  frameworks,  “reflexive  law”  (Teubner  1985)  that  regulates  by  fostering 
self-regulation,  and  new  types  of  arbitration  mechanisms.  Philip  Selznick’s  classical  Law. 
Society,  and  Industrial  Justice  t 19691,  itself  formulated  in  terms  of  a progressivist  theory  with 
Durkheimian  inclinations,  lays  out  a brilliant  analysis  of  these  legal  developments  within  the 
American  labor  regime  that  continues  to  have  analytical  value,  notwithstanding  its  shortcomings 
as  prophecy.  His  main  objective  is  to  show  that  the  institutions  of  collective  labor  law  displaced 
the  uncontrolled  powers  of  command  grounded  in  property  that  had  gone  with  the  contract  of 
employment  under  industrial  conditions,  and  that  this  displacement  has  had  paradigmatic  as  well 
as  direct  impact  on  the  legal  order.  Socialist  precursors  of  this  analysis  during  the  Weimar 
years,  expressly  stressing  the  horizontal  dualism  in  Marxism,  emphasized  the  wider 
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constlfuflonai  ramifications  of  this  type  of  coiiective  bargaining  regime,  crediting  it  with 
complementing  democratic  parliamentary  institutions  with  institutions  for  social  parity  and 
co-participation  between  primary  social  contestants  (cp.  Kettler  1984:  278-303,  Luthardt 
1986). 
A  more  cautious  legal  politological  analysis  nevertheless  acknowledges  the  formative 
demands  made  on  the  wider  system  of  law,  especially  on  the  property  regime,  by  the  legal 
aspects  of  the  labor  regimes  which  were  devised  to  accommodate  unionism  (Gorlitz  and  Voigt 
1987).  That  the  labor  regimes  are  by  no  means  unilateral  creations  by  unions  and  that  the  law 
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decisive  here,  where  the  principal  questions  concern  the  reflexive  effects  of  changes  in  labor 
law  on  the  legal  system,  as  well  as  reflexive  effects  of  changes  in the  legal  system  on  the political  system.  Our  thesis  is  that  unionism  has  been  conducive  to  democracy:  the  “push” 
towards  the  welfare  state  and  its  consolidation,  which  are  the  marks  of  twentieth-century 
democracy  in  the  wealthier  countries,  cannot  be  easily  imagined  without  the  impact  of  unions  on 
politics,  law,  and  constitution  (Habermas  198  1,  1984,  1987). 
Yet  we  have  noted  the  massive  developmental  tendencies  which  collaborate  with 
strategic  shifts  by  primary  actors  in the  labor  regime  to  render  the  future  of  union-oriented 
labor  regimes  increasingly  uncertain.  Under  these  pressures,  surviving  unions  are  often 
mhelinnnaA  ktn  +hair  r\rrrn  mamhcrrc  tr\  ~BIILEI~CI  thn  nsrrnmroct  mnct  eurl~,ciwict  and  rlefnncivp 
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policies,  regardless  of  their  impact  on  those  who  are  relegated  to  other,  undefended  sectors  of 
the  labor  regime,  too  often  inimical  to  persons  in  the  burgeoning  underclass  as  well  as  to  the 
wider,  ethical,  internationalist  and  ecological  concerns  that  contemporary  democracy  must 
address  if  it  is  to  retain  its  legitimacy.  Exceptional  positions  giving  bargatning  power  within 
some  narrow  sectors  of  the  labor  market  are  expioited  without  any  reference  to  strategic 
responsibilities.  As  a result,  unions  are  increasingly  isolated  and  rejected  among  those  whose 
alliance  the  movement  would  require  for  a renewal  of  a labor  regime  that  gives  them  a place  of 
right.  We  conclude  our  analysis  with  a respectful  but  critical  review  of  the  orientation  to  this 
present  situation  offered  by  representatives  of  the  three  principal  progressivist  approaches. 
The  review  is  respectful  because  we  are  indebted  to  much  in the  analyses  of  social  progress 
found  here.  It  is  critical  because  we  cannot,  of  course,  accept  the  progressivist  depoliticization 
implicit  in the  conclusions. 
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critiques  of  what  they  have  always  taken  to  be  the  self-defeatingly  narrow  labor  regimes 
correlative  to  the  activities  of  business,  competitive  and  participatory  unions  with  the  example 
of  burgeoning  militant  unionism  in  several  important  poorer  nations,  exemplifying  what  Cella  and 
Treu  call  “oppositional  unionism”.  In the  militancy  of  their  styles,  the  openness  to  radicalization 
of  their  tactical  demands,  and  the  express  links  between  their  stated  programs  and  political 
programs  for  comprehensive  social  change,  oppositional  unions  more  nearly  fulfil  Marxist 
hopes  for  unions  as  schools  for  working-class  revolution.  Yet  historically  they  have  always 
disnnnnintnd  social  revoiutionaries,  .,..‘-Tr_..  .-_-  ___. -. 
In  briefly  reviewing  recent  developments  in South  Africa,  South  Korea,  and Poland,  we 
want  to  show  that  union movements  are  structurally  inclined towards  labor  regimes  giving them an  independent  bargaining  role  and  permitting  political  democratization,  and  that  such  a 
conception  provides  superior  orientation  even  where  appearances  support  Marxist 
expectations.  In  South  Africa,  South  Korea  and  Poland,  oppositional  unions  arose  against  a 
scheme  of  state-supported  unions  and  in  some  measure,  paradoxically,  with  the  help  of 
opportunities  provided  by  the  old  labor  regime.  The  regime  analysis  makes  possible  a more 
accurate  understanding  of  developments  as  well  as  shielding  us  from  unargued  progressivist 
-  ----  _-_I:_*:_  _____:__,  _,z  standards  of  poiiticai  judgment.  Such  a shift  in  perspective  aiiovis  a  more  reall5w.z  appratsal  UT 
the  actual  capabilities  of  unions  as  well  as  of  long-term  designs.  Our  argument  is  not  intended  as 
a critique-of  radical  unionists’  ideologies  in  any  of  these  nations.  Problems  of  ideological 
symbolization  are  different  from  problems  of  social  analysis,  and  the  relationships  between 
them  do  not  concern  us  here.  The  narrow  focus  of  our  present  interest,  of  course,  inevitably 
yields  a rather  abstract  picture  of  the  massive  socio-political  events  in  which  unionism  forms 
only  a  part.  There  is  a matter-of-factness  in  most  union  development,  except  for  flashes  of 
intense  drama  during  certain  strikes,  not  least  because  the  people  always  have  to  go  back  to 
wnrk  in  nrdor  tn  live  Rllt  thi+  i-c nrn&adv  whv  unionism  resists  roma_nticir&on,  .._.I.  .  . . V.-W.  ._  .  .._.  __-  -..._  ._  r’  ““‘.,  --‘., 
South  African  unions  for  blacks  operated  as  illegal  “unregistered”  unions  until  1979,  but 
they  were  dealing  with  employers  oriented  to  a  collective  bargaining  regime  with  regard  to 
white  employees.  White  unions  were  state-supported  against  blacks,  through  job  reservation 
and  residential  apartheid  schemes,  but  otherwise  functioned  within  a labor  regime  resembling 
that  familiar  to  business  unions  in  other  industrialized  nations.  The  recognition  of  black  unionrsm 
through  the  qualified  extension  of  that  regime  (with  certain  racist  restrictions)  came  after  an 
upsurge  of  black  unionism  in  the  early  1970s  had  dramatized  the  issue  of  black  wages  and  black 
labor  conditions.  The  political  events  of  1976,  in  particular,  constituted  a degree  of  crisis  the 
government  had  never  seen  before  and  which  could  not  simply  be  “fixed”  by  repression.  But  the 
recognition  of  black  unionism  was  also  conditioned  by  employers’  susceptibility  to  international 
pressure  and  by  the  government’s  determination  to  put  hitherto  prohibited  organizations  with 
considerable  power  in  special  labor  markets  and  with  disciplined  solidarity  under  controls  more 
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defied  the  limits  placed  on  them  by  the  labor  regime,  especially  the  attempts  to  render  them 
unpolitical,  and  they  have  increased  black  membership  manifold  since  legalization, 
notwithstanding  coercive  sanctions  by  both  employers  (through  mass  dismissals  of  strikers)  and state  authorities.  There  is  no  doubt  that  new  consolidations  of  scattered  black  union 
organizations  and  widespread  urban  political  leadership  by  unionists  make  the  black  unions 
central  actors  in  militant  campaigns  for  black  rights  far  beyond  the  objectives  of  business 
unionism.  But  there  is  also  no  doubt  that  these  political  roles  are  grounded  in  union  functions 
and  in  the  unions’  partial  institutionalization  as  collective  bargaining  agents  in  several  industrial 
sectors.  The  wider  political  struggle  is  indispensible  for  black  trade  unions  in  South  Africa,  but 
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strengthen  the  unions’  abilities  to  exercise  trade  union  functions  is  merely  a means  to  the  end  of 
political  mobilization.  The  organizations  depend  upon  the  conjunction  of  both  campaigns.  The 
government  strategy  of  suppressing  the  political  action  of  unions  by  offering  collective 
bargaining  rights  in  exchange  for  abstention  from  the  fight  against  apartheid  clearly  failed.  The 
new  black  unionism  had  learned  the  lessons  of  repression  and  recognized  this  strategy  as  a 
fraud.  While  unions  cannot  legitimate  themselves  before  their  memberships  in  anything  but  the 
dramatic  short  term  if  they  do  not  show  themselves  serious  about  collective  bargaining 
objectives  --  and  this  is  our  principal  point  --,  they  also  cannot  pretend  to  such  seriousness  if 
they  agree  to  such  political  terms,  under  the  conditions  that  prevail  in  South  Africa.  .I0 
The  South  Korean  independent  union  movement  has  mobilized  mass  actions  against  a 
labor  regime  that  parodies  those  oriented  to  independent  unions  in  form  but  actually  restricts 
union  rights  to  yellow  unions  controlled  by  government  agents  who  are  either  simply  rn the 
service  of  empioyers  or  deferentiai  to  the  informai  subservient  laoor  regime.  The  ~ndependeni 
unions  are  allied  to  anti-militarist  oppositionists,  in  defiance  of  prohibitions  on  union  political 
action,  but  are  hardly  free  to  initiate  or  sustain  a radical  course.  Their  organizational  base,  so  far 
as  we  can  tell,  depends  on  the  promise  of  achieving  traditional  trade  union  gains.  Because  of 
the  depth  of  economic  deprivation  and  the  unifying  effects  of  opposition  to  harsh  government, 
such  organizations  do  not  have  serious  legitimacy  problems.  But  they  are  vulnerable  to  coercion 
(and,  in many  places,  to  state-supported  terror).  They  are  also  poor  in  organizational  resources. 
Accordingly,  compromises  to  protect  organizations  are  inevitable.  I1 
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narrow  perspective.  Nevertheless  there  is  something  to  be  gained  by  thinking  of  it  from  the 
perspective  of  our  thesis  about  the  structural  bias  of  the  historical  institutions  of  unionism. 
Many  might  consider  it  a  sacrilege  or  betrayal  to  think  of  incremental  improvements  in the  labor regime  as  fulfilling  the  historical  purpose  of  this  movement,  as  witness  the  internal  debates 
within  the  organization  in  early  1989.  But  the  more  modest  view  is  a useful  corrective,  we 
think,  to  dramatizations  of  human  actions  that  ultimately  denigrate  the  actual  achievements  of 
those  who  must  work  with  little.  Many  active  leaders  of  Solidarnosc  units  appear  to  agree. 
Union  accomplishments  are  almost  always  in bitter  disproportion  to  the  hopes  of  those  who 
sacrificed  most  for  them,  but  they  are  nevertheless  real.  l*  To  denigrate  such  organizational 
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efforts  because  they  aspire  to  a civiiizing  and  aemocrauzlng  laDor  regime  rarner  inan  acting  for 
some  total  transformation  as  “social  movements”  (Tourainel  or  “revolutionary  centers”  (Marx) 
must  do  is  to  permit  a misleading  theory  to  contribute  to  needless  human  pain. 
The  Weberian  tradition  of  commentary  has  always  assigned  a more  modest  and  more 
ambiguous  position  to  the  self-organization  of  labor.  With  interesting  and  important  exceptions, 
whose  theories  tend  to  integrate  Durkheimian  elements  as  well  (or  to  fit  awkwardly  within  the 
schematic  trifurcation  of  our  analysis),  these  analyses  have  concluded  that  unions  are 
anachronistic  reminders  of  a rationalizing  function  that  is  now  played  by  quite  different 
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kept  barely  alive  by  a mix  of  ingenious,  self-interested  leadership  that  is  able  to  manipulate  the 
power  resources  that  remain  at  their  disposal  together  with  essentially  irrational  and  harmful 
action  by  certain  specially-placed  members  in  privileged  economic  niches  (Olsen  1982).  Our 
objection  is  not  so  much  to  the  political  balancing  of  economic  developmental  interests  against 
the  other  interests  subservable  by  the  labor  regimes  we  have  been  reviewing.  Our  objection  is 
rather  to  an  approach  that  obviates  the  need  for  such  balancing,  on  the  premise  that  the 
argument  from  presumed  social  progress  completes  the  tasks  of  social  thought. 
Olsen  stresses  the  polarization  and  conflict  that  accompany  union-oriented  labor 
regimes.  We  do  not  deny  the  conflictual  moment,  but  we  believe  that  democracy  requires  a 
mode  of  civility  that  accommodates  such  tensions  because  we  think  that  the  alternatives 
devitalize  the  political  institution.  To  justify  this  latter  claim,  we  turn  to  the  concept  of  civi!ized 
order.  The  problem  of  civilized  order  (and  we  count  political  democracy  as  a central  constituent) 
is  not  progress  but  the  reproduction  of  civility.  This  problem  confronts  the 
Gesellschafts-sphere  itself,  and  not  a  special  Lebenswelt  (Habermas  198  1).  The  available 
answers  are  all  radically  imperfect  and  constantly  provisional.  We  think  that  the  ethics  of  the 
collective  agreement  --  which  is  very  different  from  a “social  contract”  --  is  not  only  an  apt figure  for  democratic  civility  but  an  element  that  has  to  be  secured  its  institutionalized  place. 
Hence  our  concern  about  union  decline.  This  is  an  ethics  that  conjoins  utilitarian  and  solidaristic 
considerations  in an  always  unstable  whole,  having  to  be  held  together  by  political  power  in  a 
mediated  constitutional  form  --  a political  power  that  the  parties  must  somehow  generate 
themselves.  This  constituting  activity  is  what  we  call  the  union-oriented  labor  regime.  Such 
considerations  are  not  alien  to  Weber’s  own  thought,  of  course,  but  they  are  lost  when  that 
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actual  work,  his  awareness  of  the  distinction  between  process  and  agency. 
Among  non-Marxist  analyststtosest  to  the  exceptionally  prosperous  union-oriented 
labor  regimes,  a variant  of  Durkheimian  progressivism  occupies  a central  place.  Such 
commentators  find  that  the  course  of  development  implies  a  shift  in  organizational  design 
towards  the  participatory  model,  claiming  that  adversarial  unionism  in  either  its  business  or 
competitive  forms  has  become  obsolete  and  noting  that  density  figures  suggest  comparatively 
higher  resiliency  for  participatory  unions  operating  within  neo-corporatist  settings.  l3 Taken  as 
political  counsel,  the  argument  has  much  to  recommend  it.  But  taken  as  a dictate  of 
progressivist  analysis,  it  runs  the  grave  risk  of  neglecting  the  political  presuppositions  and 
consequences  of  the  labor  regimes  that  such  cooperative  union  strategies  in  fact  may  foster. 
The  question  is  whether  a shift  to  the  “new  production-oriented”  unionism  may  not 
defunctionalize  autonomous  unions  altogether,  at  the  cost  of  the  politica!  functions  that  the 
progressive  project  requires  them  to  perform. 
Gunther  Teubner  offers  a unique  perspective  on  the  supposedly  firm  links  between 
trade  unionism  and  neo-corporatist  institutions  in  the  German  Federal  Republic.  This  is a 
noteworthy  case  because  its  stable,  comparatively  high  union  membership  figures  are  often 
cited  as  proof  that  non-adversarial  union  strategies  are  best.  1‘ Teubner  finds  a  development 
away  from  the  macro-corporatist  institutions  in  which  national  trade  unions  play  a decisive  role 
towards  a “micro-corporatism”  at  the  level  of  firms  and  enterprises,  a “producers’  coalition” 
comprising  capital,  labor,  management  and  state  officials.  In his  view,  this  tendency  accords 
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enterprises  and  generates  an  organization  optimally  capable  of  the  learning  needed  for  its 
functioning. When  considered  from  the  political  perspective  of  paramount  present  interest, 
however,  the  development  appears  to  undermine  a vital  source  of  union  legitimacy  and 
membership  strength,  the  unions’  place  in  a centralized  labor  regime.  The  enterprise-centered 
organizations  of  labor  need  not  be  tied  to  unions,  although  they  have  been  so  to  a  large  extent, 
and  in any  case  they  lack  the  power  to  strike  or  to  compel  management  to  adhere  to 
agreements  by  other  legal  means.  The  development  converges  with  complex  new  forms  of 
representation  devised  by  numerous  sophisticated  American  corporations  expressly  in  order  to 
fight  unionization.  Such  uncertain  prospects  in the  nation  with  one  of  the  most  firmly 
established  union  movements  make  it  a questionable  model  for  others  (Kochan  1985,  Teubner 
1987) 
We  conclude 
of  the  working  class 
democratization.  We 
then  with  a plea  for  respect  for  the  principal  secular  institutional  creation 
and  recognition  for  its  modest  but  substantial  contributions  to 
cannot  question  that  there  may  be  a strong  economic  logic  at  work  upon 
the  structure  of  the  labor  market,  making  it  ever  more  difficult  to  rely  for  its  organisation  on 
the  kinds  of  collective  bargaining  mechanisms  which  have  historically  sustained  unionization.  Nor 
can  we  deny  that  union  malfeasances  and  misfeasances  have  contributed  to  their  own  decline. 
But  our  analysis  leads  us  to  emphasize  the  costs  of  any  further  weakening  of  unions.  From  the 
standpoint  of  political  democracy,  an  end  of  trade  unionism  in the  West  might  be  a severe  and 
perhaps  irreplaceable  loss.  That  loss  can  be  hastened  and  intensified  by  modes  of  social  theory 
that  militate  against  its  assessment  and  against  the  reconceptualization  of  the  project  in  which 
they  have  played  a  central  role.  The  widely  proclaimed  end  of  progressivism  in  social  theory  can 
only  be  welcomed,  but  not  the  thoughtless  dismissal  of  the  social  developments  and  social 
actions  that  progressivism  taught  us  to  recognize  and  value. Notes 
1 .  Jurgen  Habermas  has  proposed  a difficult,  more  dialectical  statement  of  the  relationships 
among  conceptions  of  progress,  as  part  of  his  impressive  grand  theoretical  design  (Habermas 
1970:  1 12-  126,  1976:  173-  194,  198  1:  145-  156,  1985).  We  continue  to  see  the 
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imagine  that  we  have  refuted  Habermas  (cp.  Dallmayr,  1988).  We  are  pursuing  our  independent, 
far  more  modest  experiment,  in  hopes  that  development  of  our  model  can  also  contribute  to 
the  ongoing  collective  theoretical  effort  (Kettler  and  Meja,  19881. 
2.  Durkheim  also  writes:  ”  . ..[PutI  this  way,  the  social  question  would  present  itself  in  an  entirely 
different  manner.  It  no  longer  opposes  the  sources  of  technic  to  that  of  power,  as  two 
antagonists  who  exclude  each  other  in such  a manner  that  the  process  of  successive 
reorganization  presupposes  prior  destruction.  But  one  is  only  the  continuation  of  the  other.  It 
does  not  awaken  for  everything  that  is  or  was  a  feeling  of  subversive  hatred.  It  incites  only  to 
seek  the  new  forms  which  the  past  should  take  today.  It  is  not  a matter  of  putting  a a 
completely  new  society  in the  place  of  the  existing  one,  but  of  adapting  the  latter  to  the  new 
social  conditions.”  (Durkheim  1958:  246-7) 
3.  On  union  density  figures  in  the  U.  S.  see  S.  M.  Lipset  (1986:  1 18;  1987:  6).  On  Japanese 
union  density  figures  see  The  Japanese  Times  of  191  1 / 87,  cited  in  Social  and  Labour  Bulletin  ---- 
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